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Abstract:  Eurozone  is  going  though  the  worst  ever  crises  since  the  adoption  of  the  common 
currency in 1999. In the aftermath of financial crises of 2007, many EU government  due to their 
own  fragile  banking  system  and  imbalance  economic  structures  persued  a  debt-spending 
financing which resulted into a full-fledged sovereign debt crises .Though indebtedness increased 
in all members of the union to over come the recession but some states become more vulnerable. 
EU tried different measures to check the contagion but lack of an adequate institutional setup, 
poor coordination and the absence of a permanent mechanism to cope with such crises made the 
situation more worst. Many options have tried so far to get out of the mess but these have failed 
to  address  the  underlying  cusses  of  the  catastrophe.  The  systemic  policy  failure  has  not  only 
exposed the union to the risks of breakup but also render the future of Euro as a reserve currency 
more uncertain. Nevertheless, the challenge in the current situation demands a very well carved 
policy  which  ensures  the  integration  of  the  union  and  stability  of  the  Euro  as  the  reserve 
currency.  This  challenging  situation  underpins  the  necessity  to  move  further  with  a  strong 
political will. Improving the euro area’s fiscal woe by a balanced economic growth and overhaul 
of the regulatory architecture are the few areas calls for the serious attention of authorities. 
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Economic prosperity and the European unity are the most cherished goals of the Europeans since 
decades.  Creation of the monetary union and introduction of the common currency in 1999 were  the 
steps  taken  to  achieve  these  goals. The  very  idea  of  creation  a  single  market  was  to  have  more 
economic and financial stability but the financial crises of the 2007 and current debt crises have put 
both these cherished goals at stake. EU is trying hard to cope with the enormous debt crises since 
the  fall  of  2009.  Some  weaker  links  of  the  union  like  Greece  and  Portugal  have  suffered  the 
insolvency and some other like Spain and Ireland are punished by the bursting of housing bubble  of 
2007 which eventually paved the way of the debt crises in the union. Now this crisis is posing risks 
to the EU’s integration efforts and the future of the Euro as a reserve currency.  However the Euro  
zone  debt  crises  is  not  exception,  available  historical  evidence  suggests  that  episodes  of financial  
instability  are  frequently  associated  with  subsequent  sovereign  debt  crises,  mainly because 
bursting of a financial bubble leads to years of weak economic activity resulting in low tax revenues 
and  high  spending,  this  is  how  it  happened  in  the  EU  in  the  aftermath  of  the  2007 meltdown.  
Gravity of the current situation demands a carefully carved and well-thought out exit strategy that 
ensures the financial stability in the short run and addresses the root causes of this catastrophe. 
 
 
My PhD work investigates the genesis of the financial crises of 2007 and shape of the regulatory 
framework required to have more stable financial markets. In this aim analyzing the causes of the 
current debt crises in European Union (EU), critical assessment of the policy response and the 
long run challenges of this financial catastrophe for the EU seems very pertinent to dig out. The 
paper is divided into four sections. First section identifies the underlying causes of the debt crises. 
In the second section a very detailed analysis is presented about the different policies EU has tried 
so far to get out of this mess. Long term implications of these policies for the integration of the 
EU  and  future  of  Euro  as  Reserve  currency  are  discussed  at  length  in  the  fourth  section.  Last 
section offers some suggestions followed by the conclusion the paper. 
 
2: Underlying Causes of the Debt Crises in European Union (EU) 
 
Following section discussed at length the root causes of the problem. However it’s not just a one 
factor which can be pointed out as the base of this mess. It can be called an array of a systemic 
failure of EU policy framework. Fiscal deficits and imbalances were unsustainable in many EU 
members long before the financial crises of 2007 which latter on transformed into a recession; but 
the full-fledged debt crises started only when the confidence in the financial markets of the union 
eroded on sensing the insolvency of the Greece. The extent and depth of Greeks problem was not 
highlighted until the threats of the default Dubai world took the radar screens of the media in the 
last quarter of 2009. This was the second time when credit rating agencies failed to predict and  
assess the situation just like the failure of the Bear Sterns and Lehman collapses. EU was in denial 
in the start about any possibility of debt crises like situation and practically had no strategy in case 
if any member country required to be rescued. With this hindsight it was very difficult to imagine 
the bankruptcy of the sovereign governments. 
 
a; Misaligned Economic Structures within EU; can be stated as the fundamental to the 
debt crises. Due to these misalignments, many EU members lost their competitiveness. After the 
creation  of  single  currency,  a  spending  and  borrowing  frenzy  in  some  members  took  place 
exploiting the prevailing interest scenarios. Declined interest rates environment resulted in rise in 
wages  relative  to  the  productivity  and  some  domestic  sectors  like  construction  expanded  at  a 
ballooning  speed,  lagging  behind  the  sectors  like  manufacturing.  Lack  of  innovation  and  the 
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export  engines  of the  Union  like  Germany.  Lost  competitiveness  of these  countries  resulted  in 
eroding the earning capacities. Existing structural misalignments were enhanced further by the loose 
monetary policy of the ECB which only contributed to the housing boom in the Greece, Ireland, and 
Spain, and an unprecedented banking sector expansion in Ireland. 
 
b; Government’s financing Patterns: Many EU nations like other modern governments 
relies heavily on the debt financing option to run the economy. It seems easier to borrow the deficit 
amount  from  financial  markets  instead to  scale  back  the  government  spending  to  the  collected 
revenues  (a  standard  recipe  of  financing  the  government).  For  investors  government  bonds  are 
always secure and stable options because of the general belief of the markets that government would 
not default on its outstanding debts and hence bonds are backed by sovereign guarantees. But the 
problem arises when governments borrow more than they could repay. Greek’s public sector debt 
ballooned to 12.5% of GDP in November 2009. Bond rating agencies ignored the projections about 
its further rise over 135% of the GDP in 2011. Macroeconomic fundamentals showed that Greece 
was one of the fastest growing economies of the EU during 2000-07 and this fact made it very easy 
to ignore the skyrocketing structural debt. Trouble began when the bonds issued by the Greek 
government  declared  as  junk  by  investors  and  some  fortune  hunters  stopped  buying  making  it 
impossible  for  Greece  to  finance  its  spending  permanently  and  continuously  through  debt 
instruments. Now Portugal is going through the same scenario , despite the fact that its debt level 
are lower then  Greece  and  it tried  hard  to  manage  it  self in  the  past few  months  but  now its 
borrowings costs are increasing day by say. Each spike in the Portugal’s bond yield is making the 
Spain and Italy even more vulnerable. 
 
c; Extraordinarily large budget & external deficits: Stability and Growth pact allowed 
the members of the EU to have budget deficits not more then 3 percent of the GDP. But many 
members  of  the  periphery  were  allowed  to  enter  after  a  smart  financial  engineering  with  the 
macroeconomic  fundamentals  which  resulted  in  the  development  of  large  budget  deficits  and 
external imbalances over the past decade. In 2009 Greece's budget deficit was more then 15 percent 
of GDP followed by Ireland and Spain; both exceeded the 11 percent of GDP. Ratios of external 
account deficit to GDP were more then 10 percent for both Greece and Ireland. Ratios of gross 
external debt to GDP of Portugal and Spain were alarming i.e. 230 percent and 140 percent of GDP, 
respectively. Due to artificially high exchange rate large unsustainable trade balances developed 
among the southern countries and Ireland. This complete failure of deficit discipline shows clearly 
that almost half the Eurozone nations entered the crisis period (2007-10) with high debt ratios. 
Irresponsible spending and budgetary gaps in some members of the EU eventually resulted in the 
difficulties of the whole block. 
 
d; lack of Institutions and Legal Framework. EU does not have adequate institutions or 
mechanisms to deal with such a crisis. Present legal framework of the union excludes the insolvent 
members to access the required financial support automatically. In the wake of debt crises like 
situation when the private investors halt the bond purchases of vulnerable economies, the only way 
out left is the either IMF or the EU governments. This happened in the case of bailout packages 
approved for the rescue of Greece and Ireland. Lack of a common framework and the institutional 
depth  required  to  fight  against  the  challenging  debt  crises  has  really  hit  hard  the  union  both 
economically and politically. 
 
e; Fragile banking & Week regulatory architecture of the Union: large current 
account imbalance was financed mainly by the banks in the EU core economies. Build up of debt 
crises in the periphery resulted in threatening the stability of these institutions. Government debts 
and the bank crises were as interconnected as were policy failures. Banks in the core economies 
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2007 and balance sheets of these fragile institutions were not cleaned up properly in the run up of 
the financial meltdown, so these institutions were a standing threat waiting for a spark for further 
instability in the union. 
 
f; Inherently Flawed Construction of the EU: Buiter and Ebrahim (2010) has argued that 
the  rise  in  the  government  borrowings  in  the  aftermath  of  financial  crises  is  a  quite  normal 
phenomenon. Perhaps there are some structural flaws in the EU which has manifested in the present 
catastrophe. Putting together dozens of economies that had visibly differing levels of economic 
productivity and efficiency into a single currency was a flawed construction. Financial crises of the 
2007 and current debt crises has only exposed these uneven economic efficiency levels across the 
union. Majority of the economies of the union are earning less while spending more. Southern 
European economies of Greece, Spain, Italy and Portugal are not at comparable with Germany who 
still has a strong export base. There was lots of skepticism on the introduction of the euro in 1999 
about the mismatch between the EU’s core economies and monetary union with an incomplete 
framework of a political union. Member states peruse and focus more on he national agenda then to 
coordinate with some EU wide economic strategy.  Economic divide between Northern and the 
Southern  States  of  the  EU  is  much  more  invisible  now.  Critics  argued  since  long  that  this 
arrangement is prone to problems and imbalances that would ultimately threaten the viability of 
having a common currency 
 
g; Policies of the European Central Bank: policies and actions of the ECB also have its 
share in the financial mess the Europe is going through. A centralised monetary policy with lowered 
interest rates administer through the ECB resulted in detrimental effects for the all in the union. This 
may be pointed out as the real tragedy of the union and the euro currency that one monetary policy 
has to coordinate with more then dozen fiscal policies. Recent events have undermined very badly 
the hard earned credibility of the ECB. 
 
3: Critical Evaluation of Policy Response 
There  are  two  views  about  the  institutional  response  to  the  debt  crises.  People  at  the  helm  of 
economic policy posit that response has been swift, strong and resolute while the critics argued that 
it was lax, half hearted and EU took much time to recognize the severity of the situation. Initially 
EU’s  adhoc  and  hesitant  strategy  consisted  of  putting  up  rescue  funds,  demanding  reforms  in 
affected  economies  and  then  hoping  these  steps  would  automatically  rebuild  confidence  of  the 
financial markets and ensure the debt repayments. Lack of systemic approach and contingency plans 
and  bad timings  of  some initiatives  made  further  contribution to the already unstable  financial 
market. Union has tried different options like European bailout funds, European Financial Stability 
Facility (EFSF), EU and IMF backed rescue scheme, purchases by ECB, sharing of bailout costs by 
bondholders and the latest to set up a permanent eurozone rescue fund. Bailouts failed completely 
because this measure does nothing to address concerns of investors that the affected countries will 
be  able  to  fix  their  finances  and  pay  their  creditors.  In  fact,  the  bailout-mandated  cuts,  by 
suppressing  growth,  may  make  it  even  harder  for  affected  economies  to  repair  their  financial 
position. Bond purchases by the ECB have also failed to halt the increase in periphery bond spreads. 
A critical assessment of different policy options and their failure is analyzed below. 
 
Package for Greece by the IMF/EU/EC: insolvency of the Greek government and liquidity 
shortage in its financial institutions led the EU and the International Monetary Fund to cobble 
together a €110bn rescue package for Greece in May 2010 in lieu of certain commitments. Greece 
promised to introduce large spending cuts and tax rises. Rigorous implementation of the structural 
and financial sector reforms to improve its competitiveness, improvement in fiscal data collection 
and  provision  for  public  sector  were  also  included  in  the  terms  of  the  agreement.  In  return  it 
received loans in various tranches implying that it would not need to access markets until 2013 as 
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economies also lectured Greece about its irresponsible behaviour but in reality, all the austerity 
measures combined with other reforms have failed to solve the problems of the Greece.  These 
policies  failed  to  save  Greece  and  then  Ireland  and  they  would  definitely  fail  to  stop  further 
contagion to Portugal, Italy, and Spain. 
 
The Irish Package: Greeks package only bought few months for the union and soon it has to 
rescue the Ireland. On 28 November 2010, the Irish government and the EU/IMF announced the 
€85bn support programme. €50bn was earmarked for the budgetary support, while €35bn would be 
spending to recapitalize and restructure the banking sector. Obviously, the package was tied with 
some commitments and Conditionalities. Ireland promised its banking sector restructuring and full 
implementation of the four-year budget austerity plan. Increase in corporate taxes would not be 
included in the program despite the fact that 12.5 percent is lowest in EU as compared to some core 
economies. Although high corporate tax rate countries like Germany and France had pressurized the 
Ireland to raise corporate tax rates as a pre- condition for a bail-out but Ireland showed resistance 
because  it  would  materially  hinder  its  FDI-led  recovery,  the  most  likely  prospective  source  of 
growth for the Irish economy during the next few years. 
 
The  European  Financial  Stability  Facility  (EFSF)  &  European  Financial 
Stabilisation Mechanism (EFSM): as the part of the total rescue package amounting €750 
bn, EFSF can issue bonds guaranteed up to € 440 bn. Contributions are from all member states. In 
addition to the EFSF, another €60bn made immediately available from EFSM which can be drawn 
from  the  EU  budget.  The  IMF  also  declared  to  provide  loans  equivalent  to  up  to  50%  of  the 
contribution of the EU. The European Stability Mechanism (ESM) shall be the successor to the 
EFSF when it expires in 2013. The ESM will provide conditional financial assistance to ailing 
member countries in the same fashion as EFSF has done. However these two facilities collectively 
remained unsuccessful to cap the future uncertainties and financial markets expected more money 
and analysts also calling for increase in the funds. 
 
Failure of the Bail-Out Plans for Greece and Ireland: to safeguard against national 
bankruptcies and to strengthen the value of the euro, EU opted for the bail out strategy; clearly a 
measure of last resort. The bail out packages for the Greece and Ireland has some fundamental 
flaws; the recipe fails to acknowledge and address that both of these severely indebted economies 
would not grow until these crushing levels of public debt are reduced. Growth could be supportive 
in raising tax revenues and cutting the ratio of debt to G.D.P but unfortunately neither Greece nor 
Ireland is growing. Ireland’s external debt is 10 times bigger then the total size of its economy and 
the bank losses have already jeopardized the governments solvency, in this situation the draconian 
austerity budget measures introduced seemed a very high price for the bail out and would make the 
things even worse. It seems that EU is throwing money at debt without addressing the problem of 
wealth creation and the structural imbalances in periphery and this would eventually deepens the 
crises. In nutshell the EU’s bailout program ended in utter failure due to its inability in solving the 
underlying  causes  of  the  problem.  With  the  passage  of  the  bailouts  become  more  expensive, 
deepening the crises even more. EU has tried to appease the financial markets by extending the 
financial support in the form of an enlargement of the EFSF and the purchases of sovereign debt by 
the ECB. But unfortunately these efforts too failed to save Ireland; the likelihood of Portugal being 
next in the queue is increasing each day 
 
The Role of the European Central Bank: The ECB is clearly the key to any effective 
response to the sovereign debt and banking sector turmoil in Europe. In the event of debt crises in 
Greece, the ECB faced one of its most critical times since its creation. It has to make a difficult 
decision about buying the Greek papers which essentially means printing more money or not to buy 
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about the precise mechanism to save the Greece and the ECB made a tough choice of buying the 
Greek  papers  on  May  9,  2009  the  ECB  decided  to  buy  Greek  papers.  The  markets  responded 
positively, and the Greek economy was pulled back from the brink. This decision created a moral 
hazard and the hard earned credibility of the CB was eroded deeply. As this decision was not fully 
applauded for many it was a mistake by the ECB which tarnished the credibility of the EU nation’s 
central bank.ECB’s multiple roles as central bank also creates conflicts of interest, while prose and 
cones of sovereign debt restructuring are assessed ,this would thus potentially expose the ECB to 
losses. 
 
Need  of  a  Permanent  Crises  Response  Mechanism  (PCRM):  permanent  crises 
response mechanism is agreed on principle though the details are yet remained to be specified. 
Markets and analysts were expecting the announcement “comprehensive long-term solution” in the 
meeting of February 2011. Leaders showed their resolve to present the blue print of this mechanism 
in  the  meeting  of  March  2011.  Absence  of  such  mechanism  is  providing  easy  targets  for 
speculation, and destabilizing the markets in Portugal Spain, Italy. 
 
Options about Debt Re-Structuring: Debt restructuring is one of the options aimed to limit the 
crises. Those who opposed the idea argue that it could easily trigger a big banking and governance 
crisis (Bini-Smaghi 2010)1. Leaders of the affected economies fear that this would led them to a 
financial penalty box ultimately denying any access to funding requirements. Thus a generally held 
view is that the debt restructuring in EU’s periphery would constitute a major blow to the European 
banking system and might ushered into another whole sale financial catastrophe since the major part 
of the periphery's US$2 trillion in sovereign debt is held by the banking system of the core countries 
 
All above discussed proposals has merit but practically all these fail to address the fundamental 
causes of the crisis. Essentially stopping the debt crises and its spill over require an entire rethink of 
how  the  Eurozone  is  approaching  the  problem.  Europe  has  to  address  the  problem  by  acting 
proactively  and  getting  ahead  of the  markets  and  putting  in place comprehensive  reform-based 
mechanism and addressing the inherent imbalances between full centralization of monetary policy 
and the maintenance of almost all other economic policy instruments at the national level. Affected 
governments are trying to strengthen the rules for fiscal and broader economic policy coordination 
to fix the fiscal and macroeconomic imbalances. The core economies have created and are refining 
facilities that can provide external financial support to those facing the most intense pressures in 
sovereign debt. 
 
4: Implications and the Challenges for European Union: 
Current challenge is not just economic but has multidimensional facets, understandably having deep 
social  and  political  implications.  Strengthening  the  week  institutions  and  the  speeding  up  the 
expansion of the EU were the widely agreed objectives of the union. The euro was thought to be 
source and symbol of unity of the union but has unfortunately bred discord that has led the states 
into a blame game from the core to periphery and vice versa. Some proponents of deeper integration 
has  used  the  current  situation  of  crisis  to  launch  a  discussion  about  moving  towards  a  more 
integrated EU-wide fiscal policy. How the integration efforts suffered a blow and the future of euro 
as the currency become more uncertain is discussed below. 
 
Challenges for the Integration of the Union: The rescue packages negotiated for Greece 
and Ireland were aimed to contain the fallout of the crises. It was an attempt to establish the fact that 
EU can deal with its financial problems. No doubt the rescue packages approved by the union 
showed the audacity of the members as the trio- Portugal, Spain, and Italy are themselves heavily 
indebted economies and rumoured to be the candidates for such packages. Core economies like 
Germany and France also have unusual high debt ratios3.Stabilizing the economies of the affected 
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standing at the crossroads. Fragile treasuries of some members can be instrumental in pulling them 
apart.  If  the  fiscal  problems  are  not  come  to  halt,  continuous  bailout  demands  together  with 
unsought  economic  reforms  will  surely  lead to  dent  the  EU’s  attempts  at  unity.  Response  and 
responsibility of the Germany is very important and vital. Market’s perception about the timid 
political will of Germany would simply erode the efforts of the other members. Perhaps EU is 
suffering  from  an  integration  fatigue  resulted  due  to  member  counties  tendency  to  exploit  the 
benefits  of  the  single  currency,  and  their  reluctance  to  surrender  national  powers  over  public 
finances. EU integration process advanced quite amazingly since the Treaty of Rome was signed in 
1957.  Now  with  27  members,  it  is  the  world's  largest  single  market  and  trading  bloc.  The 
introduction  of  common  currency  in  1999  was  giant  leap forward  in  European  integration  and 
symbol of the gradual transfer of national sovereignty to the EU in essence. However over the years 
as the integration went deeper EU member states were become more hesitant to shed sovereign 
powers and policies. On the political front this fatigue translated more visibly, a good example is the 
failure of the EU's Constitutional Treaty in 2005. The Lisbon treaty came into force as the successor 
of the EU's Constitutional Treaty with the objective of streamline the EU decision-making process, 
but  unfortunately  debt  crisis  exposed  the  divide  and  showed  the  clear  lack  of  coordination  in 
important decisions and policy making. National interests overshadowed despite the Lisbon Treaty's 
mission for deeper economic and political integration. As crises unfolded, the break up of Euro is 
again subject of debates. However EU break-up remains extremely unlikely; “exit is effectively 
impossible”  (Barry  Eichengreen)  as  it  involves  huge  economic  and  political  costs  besides  the 
insurmountable  procedural  obstacles.  But  the  likelihood  may  ascend  steeply  in  the  absence  of 
required  institutional  setup.  Efforts  about  the  expansion  of  the  union  to  Scandinavian  region, 
Eastern Europe and United Kingdom got a heavy blow and now it seems quite far off. The message 
for all potential entrants is to leave their baggage before entry. 
 
Future of EURO as Reserve Currency; Euro is one of the world’s two leading currencies. 
Since its launch on 1st January 1999, it has consistently captured a significant market share as a 
reserve currency from its competitor US dollar. However when crises erupted euro immediately 
faced the pressures of loosing value but ECB’s plan to backstop European debt was a clear signal to 
the financial markets that EU will protect its currency at all costs. As the uncertainness have not 
sized in the euro area and the fears of contagion are hovering around, the efforts by the ECB and 
other steps taken by the union has done little to stabilize it. The current situation has undermined 
deeply the possibility of the euro surpassing the US dollar to take the position of a reserve currency. 
As a matter of fact the likelihood of the euro's revaluation and its continued slide toward low versus 
the U.S. dollar has increased. But if this crisis is taken as an opportunity by the periphery to address 
the fiscal imbalances it would surely regain its position. Essentially a stronger European union at the 
back of Euro would be a source of its strength in the financial markets. It is obvious that members 
sharing the common currency are obliged to cooperate for the adjustment of the imbalances and to 
prevent contagion that would destabilize the currency further and so far EU response shows that 
how union is serious to protect the currency which is symbol of its political and economic unity. But 
the bill for saving the euro looks costly even more in the wake of possible defaults of Spain and 
Portugal. Ireland’s financial support package has buy time apparently, but fundamental insolvency 
issues regarding the sovereign debt and banking system remain unaddressed. Until and unless these 
trends are capped, Euro would remain at the merci of ruthless markets. 
 
Suggestions 
Debt crises do not happened accidently so it will be resolved only with some real political will and 
serious sole searching to address the roots of the problem. A systemic failure as it is manifested, it 
require a systemic solution. Barry Eichengreen predicted this crisis in January 2009, writes: “To 
avoid similar crises in the future, Europe will have to build out the institutions of its monetary 
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the unanimous solution on which almost all analysts and policy makers are agreed. Leaders must be 
aware that  they  are  dealing  with  at  least  a five-year  problem  any  step  taken  in  haste  or for  a 
temporary gain would only add up to prevalent uncertainties. EU need an array of institutional 
arrangements to deal with the enormous economic and financial challenges it is facing. The smooth 
functioning  of  such  institutional  set  up  without  frequent  recourse  on  the  interpretation  and  the 
amendment of its Treaty would go a long way to stabilize the region. This is also the time about the 
precision on the economic governance because only fiscal consolidation alone would not solve the 
structural problems 
 
  The periphery must show increased fiscal discipline ensuring that are achieving progress on 
competitiveness, export led economic growth. The core must recognise that a depreciated 
euro and increase in the demand in core economies will help the both and greatly facilitate 
adjustment in the periphery. 
  Crises management is very important. The union’s toolkit is empty of necessary firefighting 
arsenal. Current stability facility does not work if the sovereign debt crisis should spread to 
major countries like Spain or Italy. So liquidity support facility must be enhanced to at least 
€2,000bn 
  EU lacks the required banking and financial market regulation. While its banks remain a 
mess, every shock has the potential to create a systemic crisis. Improved transparency may 
be a step in the right direction to clean up the banks. 
  National approach goes a head than the European approach in the current crises. Berlin, 
Paris and London remained the decision seat instead of Brussels. To manage an integrated 
economy, a strengthened European approach is needed rightly pointed out by Jose Manuel 
Barroso5“either swim together, or sink separately” 
  One monetary policy and 17 fiscal policies is problem that needs to be fixed up. Each 
member of the union must set up national institutions for guaranteed fiscal discipline. Many 
authors have put forward the idea of setting up domestic “Independent Fiscal Councils” 
  The ECB’s “securities purchase programme” must be an emergency time measure in an 
extraordinary situation. Member countries have to be clear that it would not be possible to 
forever buy the bad debts. Obvious implications of this are the balance-sheet risks for the 
central bank and complications in the conduct of monetary policy. 
  For the orderly resolution of sovereign debt defaults EU must devise a new mechanism. An 
IMF-style  sovereign  debt  restructuring  mechanism  or  sovereign  default  resolution 
mechanism can be one of the options. The sovereign debt restructuring mechanism could be 




Capping the debt crises is not an easy job. Financial markets are judging the resilience of EU 
authorities. Initially the EU took much time to realize the gravity of the situation and then the lack 
of  a  comprehensive  strategy  and  week  institutional  framework  added  further  to  the  problems. 
However EU’s willingness and ability is manifested by the different policy measures taken so far. 
Provision of liquidity is ensured for the fragile financial structure and governments are trying hard 
to overcome fiscal imbalances. But these measures have and would fail until or unless inherent 
imbalances are fixed. A permanent crises management mechanism is the need of hour and proper 
implementation of such mechanism in letter and spirt need more coordination and must be backed 
by the strong political will of the core members. Thinking beyond the stability and growth pact, and 
possibility of new institutional arrangements can go a long way to support adjustment processes of 
indebted member states. Bottom line is that anti-debt crisis measures need to be supplemented by 
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